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A Model of Unemployment
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Pascal Michaillat
Large fluctuations in unemployment frequently recur
across the United States and Europe, most recently in
2009, and remain a major concern for policymakers. Many
different macroeconomic theories of unemployment have
been offered. These theories deliver conflicting results
about the welfare cost of unemployment and the impact of
various labor market policies, which makes it difficult to
develop policy recommendations. In fact, there seems to be
no consensus on how much governments should spend on
unemployment-reducing policies, and which specific policies
they should implement. Therefore, it is critical to identify the
main sources of unemployment over the business cycle in
order to develop effective unemployment-reducing policies.
This is what I attempt to do in this dissertation.

Overview
This dissertation proposes a model of the labor market
that integrates two important sources of unemployment.
The first source is a matching friction, which is a friction
in matching unemployed workers to recruiting firms. The
second source is job rationing, which is a possible shortage
of jobs in the economy. To examine how these two sources
interact over the business cycle, I decompose unemployment
into a component caused by job rationing—rationing
unemployment—and another component caused by matching
frictions—frictional unemployment. Formally, I define
rationing unemployment as the level of unemployment
that would prevail if matching frictions disappeared, and
frictional unemployment as additional unemployment due to
the matching frictions.
The main theoretical result of this dissertation is that
during recessions rationing unemployment increases,
driving the rise in total unemployment, whereas frictional
unemployment decreases. Intuitively, in bad times, there are
too few jobs, the labor market is slack, recruiting is easy, and
matching frictions contribute little to unemployment.
I specify a model in which job rationing stems from a
small amount of wage rigidity and diminishing marginal
returns to labor. In the model calibrated with U.S. data,
I find that when unemployment is below 5 percent, it is
only frictional, but when unemployment reaches 9 percent,
frictional unemployment amounts to less than 2 percent of
the labor force, and rationing unemployment to more than
7 percent. These results suggest that cyclical fluctuations
in the composition of unemployment are quantitatively
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large: in expansions, all of unemployment is due to
matching frictions; on the other hand, a very large share of
unemployment can be explained by job rationing alone in
recessions.
I then show that in recessions, job rationing generates
inefficiently high unemployment, which leaves room for
labor market policies to improve social welfare. I evaluate
three labor market policies—1) direct employment, 2)
placement services, and 3) a wage subsidy—over the
business cycle. First, I compute fiscal multipliers (the
increase in social welfare obtained by spending one dollar
on a policy) as a function of the state of the labor market
to determine the effectiveness of these unemploymentreducing policies. I show that placement services are more
effective in good times than in bad times, while direct
employment and wage subsidy are more effective in bad
times than in good times. Then, I characterize the optimal
mix of policies that could be implemented by a benevolent
government. The optimal unemployment-reducing policy
evolves over the business cycle: its puts more weight on
policy instruments reducing matching frictions in good
times than in bad times; conversely, it puts more weight on
policy instruments creating jobs directly in bad times than
in good times. Intuitively in expansions, unemployment
is caused by matching frictions, so policies reducing these
frictions are effective and should be implemented in priority;
unemployment is caused by a lack of jobs in bad times, so
policies creating jobs directly are effective and should be
implemented in priority.
Below, I justify my focus on matching frictions and job
rationing as sources of unemployment. I then describe in
detail my model of unemployment, delve into the results of
the dissertation, and relate my work to the literature.

The Importance of Matching Frictions and
Job Rationing
The dissertation proposes a model of the labor market
that integrates two important sources of unemployment:
matching frictions and job rationing. It studies how these two
sources interact over the business cycle to shed new light on
the mechanics of unemployment fluctuations and the role for
unemployment-reducing labor market policies. The focus on
these specific sources of unemployment is motivated by two
observations described below.
First, labor markets see constant job destruction and job
creation, as well as large flows of workers (Blanchard and
Diamond 1989; Davis, Haltiwanger, and Schuh 1996). So,
frictions constantly hindering matching of workers and firms
are bound to influence the mechanics of the labor market.
Second, there are many hurdles to wage adjustment in
the labor market. These hurdles sometimes force wages
to remain above market-clearing levels, leading to job
rationing. Unions and minimum wage laws are examples of
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such obstacles to wage adjustment; internal labor markets
are another. Two well-documented characteristics of internal
labor markets are relevant to explain why they may lead
to job rationing. First, the internal pay structure does not
respond to competitive forces in external labor market.
For instance, Doeringer and Piore (1971) emphasize that
“the internal labor market is governed by a set of rules and
procedure.” They say that “the jobs within the internal labor
market are shielded from the direct influences of competitive
forces in the external labor markets [and] these rules are
not consistent with pricing and distribution of labor which
would prevail in a competitive market.” Therefore, when
aggregate demand for labor falls, wages are constrained to
remain above market clearing levels, rationing the number of
jobs in the economy. Second, wages in internal labor markets
tend to be high to elicit effort and dedication from employees
(Bewley 1999; Jacoby 1984). The internal labor market
organization is pervasive today, to the point where any
human resource textbook dedicates a chapter to the design of
internal labor markets (for example, Billikopf [2003]).

A Model with Matching Frictions and
Job Rationing
The model of the labor market described in the
dissertation builds on Pissarides’ (2000) search-andmatching model by relaxing two of its key assumptions:
completely flexible wages and constant marginal returns to
labor. These assumptions are critical because either implies
that unemployment would disappear in the absence of
matching frictions. To relax these assumptions, I develop
a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model in which
large, monopolistic firms face a labor market with matching
frictions, as in Blanchard and Gali (2008). All household
members are in the labor force at all times, either working
or searching for a job. Firms set prices and hire new workers
each period in response to exogenous job destruction and
technology shocks. Recruiting is costly because of matching
frictions, especially in expansions when many firms compete
to recruit from a small pool of unemployed workers.
In a frictional labor market there is no compelling
theory of wage determination, which prompts the choice
of a general wage schedule. Instead of deriving results for
a particular wage-setting mechanism, I find conditions on
the wage schedule for my results to hold. Furthermore,
this generality allows me to nest as special cases various
influential models of the search-and-matching literature,
which provide valuable points of comparison.
Central to my analysis is job rationing. This assumption
pertains to the behavior of the model at the limit when
recruiting costs are nil. In search-and-matching models,
firms and workers decide on a wage once they have matched.
Any wage falling in the interval between the flow value of
unemployment and the marginal revenue product of labor,
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which I call the efficiency set, could be supported when the
labor market is in equilibrium. This is because such a wage
respects the private efficiency of all matches: any workerfirm pair prefers accepting this wage to breaking the match
(Hall 2005).
Equilibrium unemployment in the labor market is
influenced by the distance between the wage and the upper
bound of the efficiency set (the marginal revenue product of
labor), because profit-maximizing firms enter until wage plus
marginal recruiting costs equal marginal revenue product of
labor. If wages are well below the marginal revenue product
of labor, recruiting costs must be high in equilibrium, which
implies that the labor market is tight and unemployment is
low. If wages are close to the marginal revenue product of
labor, recruiting costs must be low in equilibrium, which
implies that the labor market is slack and unemployment
is high. When recruiting costs fall to zero, determining
equilibrium unemployment is even simpler: if the wage
remains below the upper bound of the efficiency set for all
employment levels, then the economy converges to full
employment; if the wage remains below the upper bound
until some employment level N*, and is above the upper
bound for N > N*, then the economy converges to N*.
In all existing search-and-matching models, we are
in the first scenario: the economy converges to full
employment absent recruiting costs. The canonical searchand-matching model assumes that the wage is the outcome
of Nash bargaining (Mortensen and Pissarides 1994). By
construction, the wage always falls into the efficiency set,
which implies that the wage always remains below the
marginal revenue product of labor. Therefore if recruitment
costs fall to zero, firms will make a positive profit on each
new match and will enter the labor market until there is
full employment. Shimer (2004) and Hall (2005) introduce
real wage rigidity into search-and-matching models, in
the form of a constant real wage. A constant wage is not
the outcome of any bargaining, so it could fall outside the
efficiency set. However, since these models assume atomistic
firms for simplicity, the efficiency set is simply the interval
between the flow value of being unemployed and the level
of technology (which corresponds to labor productivity),
and it is independent of aggregate employment. Thus, if
technology is above the constant wage, firms enter until there
is full employment if recruitment costs fall to zero, as in the
canonical search-and-matching model.1
In contrast, I propose a model in which we are in the
latter scenario. I assume that there is a range of technology
and a nondegenerate range of employment for which the
wage lies outside of the efficiency set; more precisely,
when technology is low enough and employment is high
enough, wages are above the marginal revenue product
of labor. Under this assumption, jobs are rationed when
technology is low enough: even if recruiting costs were zero,
workers could not all be profitably employed, and some
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unemployment, which I call rationing unemployment, would
remain. This is because profit-maximizing firms expand
employment to the point where the marginal revenue product
of labor equals the marginal cost of hiring a worker, which
includes wage and recruiting costs; in particular, firms do not
hire past the point at which the marginal revenue product of
labor equals the wage. When recruiting costs are positive,
unemployment is higher than rationing unemployment, and
the difference between the former and the latter is labeled
frictional unemployment.
After an analysis of the general model, I specialize
production function and wage schedule to propose a model
in which the combination of diminishing marginal returns to
labor and some wage rigidity yields job rationing. Intuitively,
after sufficiently large negative technology shocks, the
marginal revenue product of labor falls; wages only partially
adjust downward, such that wage may now be higher than
the marginal revenue product of labor for the last workers
in the labor force. Accordingly, firms cut employment to
increase the marginal revenue product of labor at least until it
equals the wage. In this model, jobs are rationed because not
all workers could be employed even absent recruiting costs.
The assumptions of wage rigidity and diminishing
marginal returns to labor are appealing because they are
standard in the macroeconomic literature, and because they
have received convincing empirical support. At business
cycle frequency, some production inputs may be slow to
adjust; thus, short-run production functions are likely to
exhibit diminishing marginal returns to labor. There are
also substantial ethnographic and empirical literatures
documenting wage rigidity. Hence, job rationing arises
naturally in a search-and-matching model of the labor
market.
The model of the labor market put forward in the
dissertation is amenable to evaluating a number of labor
market policies. In the last part of the thesis, I introduce
three unemployment-reducing policies into the dynamic
stochastic general equilibrium model. The first one is direct
employment, which hires unemployed workers in publicsector jobs, or offers contracts to private-sector firms to
produce goods consumed by the government. The second
policy is placement services, which enhance unemployed
workers’ job search efficiency to reduce matching frictions.
The third policy is a wage subsidy, which reduces the cost
of labor faced by private firms. Studying these policies is
especially relevant since governments have historically
resorted to these policies on a large scale. These three
policies are also among the most commonly used by
European states.

Contributions
This dissertation develops a tractable model that
distinguishes between two components of unemployment:
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rationing unemployment and frictional unemployment.
By studying these components, I derive three results that
improve our understanding of unemployment fluctuations:
1) I show that during a recession, rationing unemployment
increases, driving the rise in total unemployment, while
frictional unemployment decreases; 2) I construct historical
time series for frictional and rationing unemployment in a
calibrated model of the labor market to find that fluctuations
in the composition of unemployment are quantitatively large;
3) I study the normative implications of these positive results
to find that the optimal unemployment-reducing policy
should evolve with the state of the labor market: the optimal
policy aims at creating jobs directly in recessions, and at
reducing matching frictions in expansions.
When do matching frictions matter? Not in bad times
I formally define the rationing component of
unemployment as the part that would prevail if recruiting
costs were zero, and the frictional component as additional
unemployment due to positive recruiting costs. Rationing
unemployment quantifies the amount of unemployment due
to job rationing, whereas frictional unemployment quantifies
the amount due to matching frictions.
This dissertation proposes a condition under which
rationing unemployment is positive. It then proves
theoretically that during a recession, rationing unemployment
increases, driving the rise in total unemployment, while
frictional unemployment decreases. This result suggests
that job rationing trumps matching frictions to explain
unemployment in recessions. These frictions, however,
remain central to understand unemployment in expansions.
Intuitively, job rationing in recessions is more acute.
Therefore, rationing unemployment increases, raising total
unemployment. This means that a firm posting a vacancy
will receive more applications from the large pool of
unemployed workers, and it will be able to fill its vacancy
more rapidly, and at a lower cost. So in recessions, because
of matching frictions, the marginal cost of labor does
not increase as much, monopolistic firms do not reduce
production as much, and there is not much additional
unemployment. Consequently matching frictions contribute
less to unemployment, and frictional unemployment is lower
in recessions.
Historical time series for frictional
and rationing unemployment
To quantify the fluctuations of frictional and rationing
unemployment over the business cycle, I consider a special
case of the general model in which the combination of
diminishing marginal returns to labor and some wage rigidity
leads to job rationing. Calibrating the model and imposing
technology shocks estimated in U.S. data produces moments

3

for labor market variables that are close to their empirical
counterparts. In particular, even a small amount of wage
rigidity, such as that estimated in microdata with earnings
of newly hired workers (for example, Haefke, Sonntag,
and Van Rens [2008]), is sufficient to amplify realistic
technology shocks as much as observed in the data. I also
compare actual unemployment with the unemployment
series simulated from actual technology. Model-generated
unemployment matches actual unemployment closely. These
results suggest that in spite of its simplicity, the model fits
the data notably well, lending support to the quantitative
analysis of unemployment and its components.
Exploiting the calibrated model, I decompose historical
U.S. unemployment into historical time series for rationing
unemployment and frictional unemployment. These series
suggest that as long as total unemployment is below 5.2
percent, it can all be attributed to matching frictions. On
average, total unemployment amounts to 5.8 percent of the
labor force, frictional unemployment to 4.3 percent, and
rationing unemployment to 1.5 percent. But in the second
quarter of 2009, when total unemployment reached 9.2
percent, rationing unemployment increased to 7.6 percent,
while frictional unemployment decreased to 1.6 percent.
Next, I simulate moments for unemployment and its
components. I find that rationing unemployment is more than
twice as volatile as frictional unemployment.
Although concepts similar to those of frictional
and rationing unemployment have long existed, this
quantitative analysis has not previously been conducted.2 As
highlighted by Romer (2002), “We do not know if frictional
unemployment is one-quarter or three-quarters of total
unemployment.”

is a function of how much it crowds out private employment;
in bad times, competition for workers is weak and crowding
out is limited. Thus, this policy is effective. Finally, a wage
subsidy reduces the marginal cost of labor, which leads
firms to increase employment; higher aggregate employment
increases the labor market tightness and recruiting costs
until a new equilibrium is reached, at which point the new
marginal cost of labor equals the marginal revenue product
of labor. In bad times, recruiting costs are low and do not
vary much with employment, so a wage subsidy triggers a
large increase in employment. In good times, recruiting costs
are high and increase rapidly with employment, so a wage
subsidy will only achieve a small increase in employment;
thus, a wage subsidy is more effective in bad times. In a
calibrated model, when unemployment increases from 4
percent to 12 percent, the multiplier for placement services
decreases from 2 utils per dollar to 0.5 utils per dollar, the
multiplier for direct employment increases from 0.3 util
per dollar to 1 utils per dollar, and the multiplier for wage
subsidy decreases from 1 util per dollar to 3.5 utils per dollar.
Then I characterize the optimal mix of policies
implemented by a benevolent government. The optimal
unemployment-reducing policy evolves over the business
cycle: its puts more weight on policy instruments reducing
matching frictions (placement services) in good times than
in bad times; conversely, it puts more weight on policy
instruments creating jobs directly (direct employment and
wage subsidy) in bad times than in good times.

State-dependent labor market policies

The decomposition of unemployment into rationing
unemployment and frictional unemployment, as well as
the characterization of the cyclical fluctuations in the
components of unemployment, is new to the literature. In
fact, existing models of unemployment only account for
one single source of unemployment and are not amenable to
unemployment decomposition.
For instance, in existing search-and-matching models,
unemployment disappears when recruiting costs converge
to zero. In other words, there is no job rationing and all
unemployment is frictional. The canonical search-andmatching model features atomistic firms in which the
marginal product of labor remains above the value of
unemployment for workers (Mortensen and Pissarides
1994; Pissarides 2000). Once search costs are sunk, matches
always generate a positive surplus, which is shared between
firm and worker by Nash bargaining over wages. When
recruiting costs converge to zero, the net profit from a match
is positive for any level of employment. Consequently, firms
enter the labor market until all the labor force is employed.
The property that unemployment disappears when recruiting

This dissertation shows that when job rationing generates
inefficiently high unemployment, labor market policies
can improve welfare significantly. Specifically, I evaluate
three labor market policies over the business cycle: 1) direct
employment, 2) placement services, and 3) a wage subsidy.
I assume that the government can commit to these policies.
Policies are financed by an exogenous, stochastic stream of
income, and by issuance of state-contingent debt.
The fluctuations in rationing and frictional unemployment
suggest that optimal unemployment-reducing policies should
adapt to the changing state of the labor market. To formalize
this intuition, I compute state-dependent fiscal multipliers—
the increase in social welfare obtained by spending one
dollar on a policy. I show that placement services are more
effective in good times than in bad times. The converse is
true of direct employment and wage subsidy. Intuitively,
in bad times, frictional unemployment is low; placement
services aim to further reduce this component and are
therefore ineffective. The effectiveness of direct employment
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Relation to the Literature
The search-and-matching framework
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costs converge to zero also holds when rigid wages are
introduced into the model (Shimer 2004; Hall 2005). This is
because rigid wages always lie between the marginal product
of labor, which is independent of employment, and the value
of unemployment for workers. As with the basic search
model, with no search costs firms enter the labor market until
all the labor force is employed. Lastly, this property holds
in large-firm search-and-matching models with diminishing
marginal returns to labor (Cahuc and Wasmer 2001; Elsby
and Michaels 2008). This is because these models use Stole
and Zwiebel’s (1996) intrafirm bargaining mechanism to set
wages. Thus, the wage is derived from Nash bargaining over
surplus from the marginal worker-firm match, and the wage
remains below the marginal product of labor for any level of
employment. Consequently, employers expand employment
until all the labor force is employed when recruiting costs
fall to zero.
The absence of job rationing in existing search-andmatching models is critical. Without job rationing, all
unemployment is frictional, which has several important
implications for the impact of labor market policies on
unemployment: policies improving matching always
reduce unemployment significantly, direct job creation
by the government has no effect on unemployment, and
policies reducing the search effort of the unemployed
always increase unemployment significantly. This paper
offers a more nuanced theory of unemployment over the
business cycle in which job rationing is the most important
source of unemployment in recessions, and matching
frictions are the most important source of unemployment
in expansions. These results suggest that the effectiveness
of labor market policies depends on the state of the labor
market: policies improving matching reduce unemployment
in expansions but not in recessions, direct job creation by the
government has no effect on unemployment in expansions
but reduces unemployment in recessions, and policies
reducing the search effort of the unemployed, such as a
generous unemployment insurance, increase unemployment
in expansions but have no effect on unemployment in
recessions. From a normative standpoint, these results imply
that policymakers should adapt labor market policies to the
state of the labor market.
The design of optimal fiscal policies
The policy results derived in the dissertation are related
to two strands of literature. First, search models of the labor
market have been specifically designed to study particular
labor market policies, but these policies have never been
compared (Mortensen and Pissarides 1999; Pissarides 2000;
Cahuc and Zylberberg 2004). In addition, these studies
do not emphasize the variations in the effectiveness of
policies at different points of the business cycle. Second,
raising revenue to finance policies could be distortionary. I
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abstract from these distortions and instead determine how to
optimally spend a given amount of tax revenue. Therefore,
these results complement the large literature on optimal
taxation, which determines the least costly way to finance a
given amount of government spending (Lucas and Stokey
1983; Chari, Christiano, and Kehoe 1991; Aiyagari et al.
2002).
Macroeconomic models of unemployment
More generally, this paper contributes to the
unemployment literature by integrating two major strands
of research: the search-and-matching literature, which has
become the standard theoretical framework for analyzing
labor market fluctuations, and the job-rationing literature.
The Mortensen-Pissarides search-and-matching model has
become the standard framework to analyze unemployment
and labor market dynamics (Pissarides 1985; Mortensen
and Pissarides 1994; Pissarides 2000). This model generates
unemployment because workers cannot obtain jobs by
bidding down wages to their reservation wage: in the
presence of matching frictions, it takes time and effort to
establish contact with an employer. This model has been used
widely in macroeconomics and related disciplines; it has
been embedded into real business cycle models (Merz 1995;
Andolfatto 1996), dynamic stochastic general equilibrium
models with wage and price rigidities (Blanchard and Gali
2008; Gertler and Trigari 2009), trade models (Helpman
and Itskhoki 2007; Helpman and Redding 2008), and has
been studied to understand the impact of different policy
interventions on unemployment (Mortensen and Pissarides
1999; Cahuc and Zylberberg 2004).
The job-rationing literature, on the other hand, dates at
least as far back as Keynes’ wage floor. Researchers in this
literature drew on field studies by psychologists, sociologists,
social psychologists, and anthropologists to motivate their
models. This literature includes work on efficiency-wage
models (Stiglitz 1976; Solow 1979; Akerlof and Yellen
1990), gift-exchange models (Akerlof 1982), insider-outsider
models (Lindbeck and Snower 1988), and social-norm
models (Solow 1980, Akerlof 1980). These papers put forth
different theories explaining why profit-maximizing firms
may set wages above market-clearing levels. Generally,
these theories postulate that higher wages increase effort
and dedication to the firm, thus increasing productivity and
profitability. These theories have received support from
economists who have studied wage-setting practices in the
field (for example, Okun [1981]; Campbell and Kamlani
[1997]; Bewley 1999). In these models, unemployment is
the equilibrium outcome of the shortage of jobs induced by
excessively high wages.
This dissertation merges these branches of the literature to
show that unemployment is best described as a combination
of frictional and rationing unemployment: the search-and-
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matching theory describes the labor market well in normal
and good times, and job-rationing theory describes the labor
market well in bad times, but only the integration of both
theories provides a good understanding of business-cycle
fluctuations in the labor market. This integration delivers
novel and important policy recommendations as well.
Notes
1. Note that if technology is below the constant wage, the labor
market shuts down and all workers are unemployed for any
recruiting cost.
2. Rationing unemployment is similar to classical unemployment
if rationing results from real wage rigidities. It is similar to
cyclical unemployment if rationing results from demand shocks
and price rigidity.
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